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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL POWER-COURT FUND-
ING-REASONABLE NECESSITY-The Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia held that a survey of salaries offered by competing employers
was insufficient evidence of the necessity to increase the salaries of
court employees.
Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1993).
The Honorable Judge Edwin L. Snyder, President Judge of the
Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County ("Plaintiff"), re-
quested that the fiscal year 1989 budget for his county's court con-
tain enough money so that court employees could be given five
percent pay raises.' When the Jefferson County Salary Board2 de-
cided to maintain all wages at the previous year's level, Plaintiff
filed a complaint in mandamus seeking to compel payment and to
award attorneys fees and costs.3
The Plaintiff claimed that failure to provide the court staff with
requested salary increases could affect employee morale, possibly
prompting some employees to leave their jobs.4 The raises sought
were derived from a salary schedule adopted by the Jefferson
County Commissioners ("Commissioners") in 1986.5 That schedule
was based upon surveys conducted by the Pennsylvania Economy
League ("Economy League") at the request of the Commissioners.6
The Economy League surveyed various public and private sector
employers in and around Jefferson County to determine average
salaries and pay increases in jobs similar to those held by county
workers.1 Because the survey showed that the county was paying
its workers below that average, the Economy League developed,
and the Commissioners adopted, a new seven-step wage scale
which placed all county employees at the level appropriate to their
1. Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1993).
2. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1135. The Jefferson County Salary Board was comprised of
the three County Commissioners, including Keith D. Snyder, the first named defendant, the
President Judge and the County Treasurer. Id. at 1133.
3. Id. at 1134.
4. Id. at 1136.
5. Id. at 1135.
6. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1135. The study was first conducted in 1986 and was then




training and experience.8 The Plaintiff's budget request for 1989
recommended that each court worker move to the next step on the
scale, as they had in each of. the previous two years."
The Plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
exercise plenary jurisdiction. 10 The supreme court granted the pe-
tition and then appointed Judge Silvestri Silvestri of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County as master." The master found
that appropriations for five positions within the 1989 court budget
were funded at levels lower than requested. 2 However, the
master's report also found that the Plaintiff failed to provide other
"critical" evidence, including the court's past and current case load
and future projected case loads." Without this information, the
master concluded that the Plaintiff had not met his burden of
proof and the master's report recommended that the complaint be
dismissed and the request for award of counsel fees be deferred
until the matter was concluded. 4 Judge Snyder filed exceptions to
that report. 5
While there were three issues raised in the appeal of the master's
report, the supreme court dealt only with what it considered the
pivotal issue: whether the Plaintiff met his burden of proving that
his budget requests were reasonably necessary to the effective ad-
ministration of justice.'" In order to meet this burden, the court
said a plaintiff must show that the proposed salary increases were
8. Id. at 1135. A total of 30 Jefferson County workers were placed on the new scale.
Id.
9. Id.
10. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1134. Plenary jurisdiction is "full and complete jurisdiction
or power of a court over the subject matter as well as the parties to a controversy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990).
11. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1134. Judge Silvestri has since become a Senior Judge on the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. Id. at n.1.
12. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1135. In its opinion, the supreme court provided the follow-
ing table outlining the master's findings in this area:
Office Requested Appropriated Difference
Court Administrator $21,770 $20,743 $1,027
Judge's Secretary 16,867 16,071 796
Domestic Relations Dir. 21,034 20,042 992
Chief Adult Probation Dept. 26,190 23,696 2,494
Chief Juvenile Justice Dept. 24,350 23,201 1,149
13. Id. at 1136.
14. Id. at 1134-36.
15. Id. at 1134.
16. Id. at 1136. Plaintiff's other arguments, not addressed by the supreme court, were
that the master improperly required a showing that the requested funds were absolutely
necessary and not just reasonably necessary, and that the master required a higher standard
of proof than required by case law. Id.
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reasonably necessary to attract and retain qualified people. 17 Chief
Justice Nix, who authored the opinion, stated that such a determi-
nation could not be made without comparing court wages with
those paid by competing employers.18 Concerned with preserving
the separation of legislative and judicial powers, the court reasoned
that evidence of this type must be critically analyzed. 9
The court concluded that the proof offered in this case, specifi-
cally the surveys conducted by the Economy League, did not prove
reasonable necessity, since the surveys did not indicate the actual
salaries of public and private sector employees working at jobs
similar to those of the Jefferson County court staff.2 0 While it
found the Economy League report persuasive, the court noted that
the report was not dispositive since the survey included data col-
lected from employers who were not in competition with the Jef-
ferson County court system.2 The supreme court therefore held
that the Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving that staff
salary increases were reasonably necessary for the effective admin-
istration of justice.22
The supreme court also denied the Plaintiff's request for attor-
neys fees and costs in pursuing this case.23 The court cited the gen-
17. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1136 (citing Lavelle v. Koch, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992)). In
Lavelle, the president judge of the Common Pleas Court in Carbon County filed an action in
mandamus, seeking to compel the county's salary board to supply $22,716 in additional em-
ployee wages for the 1989 fiscal year, and also demanded payment of attorneys fees and
costs for the mandamus action. Lavelle, 617 A.2d at 320. See notes 73-76 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Lavelle.
18. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1136.
19. Id. at 1136-37. The court noted that the power to spend money is exclusively a
legislative function, and that the only time the judiciary may compel funding occurs when it
cannot properly function because it has not been given enough money by the legislative
branch. Id. at 1137 (citing Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth ex
rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied sub nom, Tate v. Pennsylvania ex rel.
Jamieson, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949); Commonwealth ex
rel. Hepburn v. Mann, 5 Watts & Serg. 403 (i843); In re Surcharge of County Commission-
ers, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471 (C.D. Lackawanna 1928)). See notes 55-60 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Beckert. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Car-
roll. See notes 42-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Leahey. See notes 27-31 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Hepburn. See notes 32-41 and accompanying text for
a discussion of In re Surcharge.
20. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1137.
21. Id. The court pointed out that four of nine employers surveyed in 1986 and five
of eleven surveyed in 1988 were located outside Jefferson County and adjacent counties. Id.
In both surveys, two of the respondents were located more than 150 miles away. Id. at 1138.
These facts led the court to doubt that the Jefferson County court system was actually
competing in the same labor market as some of these survey respondents. Id. at 1137-38.
22. Id. at 1138.
23. Id.
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eral rule that a litigant cannot recover such fees from the opposing
party unless there is a statute authorizing such an award.2 4 In a
footnote, the supreme court also dismissed the Plaintiff's argument
that the costs of this suit were reasonably necessary for the court's
proper functioning.25 The court said any judge in the common-
wealth can use the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania
Courts for legal services.26
Disputes between Pennsylvania's judicial and legislative
branches over court funding and court employee salaries have been
occurring for more than a century. In 1843, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania dealt with the constitutionality of an attempt by the
General Assembly to repeal salary increases previously given to
common pleas court judges in the case of Commonwealth ex rel.
Hepburn v. Mann.27 The issue before the court was whether article
V, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prevented the legis-
lature from reducing the salary of a common pleas court judge af-
ter the judge takes office.28 The supreme court determined that ar-
ticle V, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was based on a
similar section of the United States Constitution29 and that both
were enacted in an effort to ensure an independent judiciary by
providing that judges could not have their salaries reduced by a
legislature which might seek to coerce or punish the judiciary or an
individual judge. 0 In granting the mandamus request, the court
held that if the repeal of a statute was contrary to the constitution,
the repealing act must be void and therefore the original statute, in
24. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1138 (citing Chatham Communications, Inc. v. General Press
Corp., 344 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1975), and Shapiro v. Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890 (Pa. 1965)).
25. Id. at n.8.
26. Id. (citing Lavelle, 617 A.2d at 323 (quoting PA. R.J.A. 505 (15))).
27. 5 Watts & Serg. 403 (Pa. 1843). In Hepburn, President Judge Samuel Hepburn of
the Court of Common Pleas of the Ninth Judicial District filed a mandamus action against
the State Treasurer, seeking to compel payment of $400 in salary the judge claimed he was
owed. Hepburn, 5 Watts & Serg. at 404. The Treasurer claimed he could not authorize pay-
ment from the state treasury of the money since state lawmakers voted to repeal the $400
annual salary increase they had approved for judges nearly four years earlier. Id. at 404-05.
28. Id. at 405. Article V, section 2 of the constitution provides that, "[t]he President
Judges of the several Courts of Common Pleas shall, at stated times, receive for their ser-
vices adequate compensation, to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
29. Hepburn, 5 Watts & Serg. at 407. The comparable section of the U.S. Constitu-
tion reads, in part: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Service a Com-
pensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." U. S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
30. Hepburn, 5 Watts & Serg. at 407-09.
630 Vol. 32:627
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this case the one establishing the pay raise, remained in force.3
While Hepburn established that judges' salaries are protected
from legislative reduction by the state constitution, a series of
cases in the early 1900s established that the courts have power to
compel a legislature to pay the salaries of other court employees.
This development was traced in the case of In re Surcharge of
County Commissioners.s2 At issue in In re Surcharge was whether
a common pleas judge had the power to appoint a clerk at a salary
to be paid for by the county. s The court concluded that courts
have inherent powers to do whatever is reasonably necessary to
properly perform'their judicial functions.3 4 To support its conclu-
sion, the court cited cases from the early 1900s: Rosenthal v.
Luzerne County, in which a neighboring county court ordered that
payment be made to a stenographer after the county commission-
ers initially refused to approve her bill of $88;" 5 Lancaster County
v. BrinthaUl, an action by a constable seeking and receiving pay-
ment for his services; 6 and McCalmont v. Allegheny County,
which held that the clerk of the supreme court could recover
money he paid for storage of court records.3 7 The court in In re
Surcharge also relied upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling
in In re Janitor of Supreme Court, which it termed a "leading
case," where the court determined that it alone possessed the
power to appoint staff members to assist the court, including, in
this case, the appointment of the court's janitor.38
The court in In re Surcharge also provided examples of situa-
31. Id. at 422. The court also ruled that the same constitutional provision prevented
the enforcement of an income tax withholding provision insofar as that provision affected
the salary of Judge Hepburn. Id.
32. 12 Pa. D. & C. 471, 475 (Lackawanna County 1928). The case of In re Surcharge
of County Commissioners was filed by a group of taxpayers in Lackawanna County who
sought to have the courts impose a surcharge against the commissioners for the salary paid
to a clerk hired by one of the county's judges. In re Surcharge, 12 Pa. D. & C. at 473-75.
33. Id. at 475.
34. Id.
35. In re Surcharge at 475 (citing Rosenthal v. Luzerne County, 12 Pa. D. 738, 740
(1903)).
36. In re Surcharge at 476 (citing Lancaster County v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38, 38-39
(1857)).
37. Id. (citing McCalmont v. Allegheny County, 29 Pa. 417, 418-20 (1857)).
38. In re Surcharge at 478 (citing In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410, 419
(1874)). The court in In re Surcharge also recounted a virtually identical 1902 case in Lack-
awanna County in which the common pleas court insisted upon its right to name janitors
and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the county commissioners to pay these janitors.
In re Surcharge, 12 Pa. D. &. C. at 478. The court could not provide an official cite because
the case was not reported and could not be located in the county prothonotary's office. Id.
1994
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tions in which a court could exercise its inherent powers to order
the payment of public money for court purposes.39 However, the
opinion also stressed that a court's inherent power to compel pay-
ment for court appointed staff members was limited by the re-
quirement that such appointments be "reasonably necessary."'
The court concluded that the appointment of the clerk in the case
of In re Surcharge of County Commissioners was a proper use of
the court's inherent power because the appointment was reasona-
bly necessary."'
The opinion in In re Surcharge was authored by Judge Maxey,
.who played a role in the next major Pennsylvania case in this area
of law, Leahey v. Farrell,"2 decided in 1949 by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, with the former common pleas court judge sitting
as Chief Justice.'3 Beginning with Leahey, the courts began to fo-
• cus on the limits of inherent judicial power. The Leahey court de-
cided whether the legislature had the power to regulate the wages
of court workers or whether that power was held exclusively by the
judges of the court." The supreme court held that, while courts
possess inherent powers to compel payment for necessities, judges
must comply with a statute which imposes reasonable fiscal regula-
tions.45 The statute at issue in Leahey was the statute that estab-
lished county salary boards and made the salary boards responsi-
ble for determining wages for all county employees, including those
working in the court system."' The supreme court said courts may
only exercise their inherent powers when the legislature or county
salary board acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner and does not
allow for an adequate number of court employees or fails to pay
them adequately, and in the process impairs or destroys the ad-
ministration of justice.'7 In Leahey, the court found no legislative
39. Id. at 478-79. The list included the feeding and lodging of jurors, the payment of
doctors who treat ill jurors, the transportation of jurors, the appointment of ballot-box cus-
todians, and the appointment of bodyguards to protect judges. Id.
40. Id. at .483.
41. Id. at 484.
42. 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949). In Leahey, the judges of the Common Pleas Court of
Cambria County increased compensation for court reporters (stenographers) without ap-
proval of the county's salary board, and when the County Commissioners and Comptroller
refused to process the pay raises, the judges issued an order directing the payments be
made. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 578.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 578.
45. Id. at 580.
46. Id. at 578.
47. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 580.
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infringement upon the court's inherent powers, that the court was
therefore under a duty to comply with the statutory procedure,
and that the court had failed in that duty.
4'
In 1971, the supreme court focused its attention on the judicial
requirement of showing reasonable necessity in the exercise of in-
herent power to compel funding. The case before the court was
Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate,'e in which the court deter-
mined what level of funding was reasonably necessary and which
party bears the burden of proving reasonable necessity.5 0 The court
held that the burden was on the plaintiff-court to establish that
the money it sought was reasonably necessary.5 1 The defendants
had argued that, in determining what level of funding was reasona-
bly necessary for the courts, the overall financial difficulties facing
a city should be considered.52 However, the majority concluded
that a city's financial problems are not more important than the
constitutional mandate that there be a free and independent judi-
ciary.5 3 The supreme court agreed with the findings of the master
it had appointed to hear the case, and affirmed the master's order
for additional .funding.5'
Ten years after Carroll, Pennsylvania's highest court again reaf-
firmed the existence of the judiciary's inherent power to compel
48. Id. The Leahey court was also concerned with the separation of powers issue
presented by the case. Id. at 578. In interpreting article III, section 16 and article IX, sec-
tion 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court stated that, while the legislature controls
state finances, the constitution presumes that the legislative and judicial branches will coop-
erate with each other when their functions overlap. Id. at 579.
49. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied sub nom., Tate v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Jamieson,
402 U. S. 974. (1971). In Carroll, President Judge Vincent Carroll of the Common Pleas
Court of Philadelphia filed a mandamus action to compel Mayor James Tate and the mem-
bers of City Council to provide more than $5.2 million in additional funding for the court's
fiscal year 1970-71 budget. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194-95.
50. Id. at 197-99.
51. Id. at 199 (citing Leahey, 66 A.2d at 193). The court in Carroll actually credited
the Leahey court with establishing this holding by "necessary implication," although the
Leahey opinion never actually used this precise terminology. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 199.
52. Id.
53. Id. While concurring in the result, Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen, wrote
separately to voice disagreement with the sweeping nature of this holding. Id. at 203-04
(Jones, J., concurring). Justice Jones said he believed that a determination of a reasonably
necessary amount must take into account the financial resources the city has available. Id.
at 204. In this case, he concluded that appropriate resources were available at the time the
case was decided. Id.
54. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 199. Judge Harry M. Montgomery of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania had been appointed master by the supreme court. Id. at 195. In the hearing
before Judge Montgomery, the plaintiff-court reduced its request for additional funds from
$5.2 million to $3.9 million. Id. at 194-95. Judge Montgomery found that the plaintiff-court
had shown $2.4 million of the amended request was reasonably necessary. Id. at 196.
1994 633
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reasonably necessary expenditures, but also sought to define "rea-
sonable necessity. '55  In Beckert v. Warren, the court said there
must be a clear delineation of the circumstances in which the
court's inherent power is used.56 The court stated that the use of
such power is to be seen as exceptional and should be exercised
only in times of crisis, when there is a real threat to the judicial
system caused by the actions of the legislature.5 7 In order to define
a reasonably necessary expenditure, the court set forth a new
test."" If the judiciary would be unable to carry out its responsibili-
ties to administer justice without the expenditure, then such
money can be deemed reasonably necessary, 59 but this is not a de-
termination that a court can make on its own, unilaterally. 0
More recently, in County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,61 con-
stant disputes over court budgets between common pleas court
judges and commissioners in Allegheny County led the county to
file an action against the Commonwealth, seeking to have the state
take over funding of the court system. In that case, the supreme
court agreed with the county's argument that the state constitu-
tional mandate of a unified judicial system in the Commonwealth
was at odds with a system of funding of common pleas courts by
the counties in which those courts sit.62 However, because the
court's order required the General Assembly to enact funding legis-
lation, the court stayed the order to allow the legislature to resolve
the funding dilemma.6 " Until that stay is lifted, the current system
55. Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1981).
56. Beckert, 439 A.2d at 642. In Beckert, the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County sought to enjoin the County Commissioners from adopting the county's 1981 budget
because it did not provide for the full amount of funding requested by the court. Id. at 640.
57. Id. at 643.
58. Id. at 647.
59. Id. The court also said the test could be applied in the alternative; that is, if an
expenditure is one that allows a court to carry out its responsibilities, then it is reasonably
necessary. Id.
60. Beckert, 439 A.2d at 648.
61. 534 A.2d 760, 761 (Pa. 1987).
62. County of Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 765. The relevant portion of the Pennsylvania
Constitution on which the court based its holding is article V, section 1, which states:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system
consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court,
courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace.
All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judi-
cial system.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
63. County of Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 765.
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of county funding of its common pleas courts would remain in
effect.6"
The supreme court has, however, refused any attempt at enforc-
ing the sweeping mandate it outlined in its order in County of Al-
legheny. First, in 1988, the court affirmed an order of the common-
wealth court, directing the City of Philadelphia to fund its court
system, stating that the mandate of County of Allegheny did not
relieve Philadelphia of its obligation to provide money for the
city's court system. 5 Then, in May of 1993, Allegheny County,
joined by five other counties in Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania
Association of County Commissioners, filed a motion seeking to
have the supreme court enforce its judgment in County of A le-
gheny.66 The plaintiffs claimed that because the 1992 state budget
eliminated all funding for common pleas courts and district jus-
tices, the legislature had violated the original order in County of
Allegheny.67 The court denied the motion.68 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Flaherty said the 1987 order, which the plaintiffs
sought to have enforced, was only concerned with the method of
court funding, not the level of that funding.69 Justice Flaherty rea-
soned that, since the petition before the court had to do with levels
of funding, rather than methods, the issue of whether the legisla-
ture had violated the 1987 order was not before the court. 0
While the majority opinion avoided a confrontation with the leg-
islature over the court's 1987 order, the dissent filed by Chief Jus-
tice Nix called that order "unenforceable."'" Justices Larsen and
Papadakos also dissented, saying the court's failure to take a stand
64. Id. Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott, filed a dissent in County of
Allegheny, stating that the majority relied upon a non-existent constitutional mandate in
arriving at its decision, and that its ruling amounted to judicial interference with matters
clearly delegated to the legislative branch of government. Id. at 765. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice also used the term "ludicrous" to describe the majority's asserted belief
that court funding, which comes directly from the state, would resolve the political bicker-
ing which has existed in the current funding scheme. Id. at 767.
65. Bradley v. Casey, Nos. 119 and 122 E.D. Appeal Dkt (Pa. Dec. 1, 1988). In Brad-
ley, Philadelphia city officials filed a mandamus action against the governor and other state
officials, seeking to force them to comply with the supreme court's order in County of Alle-
gheny. Bradley v. Casey, 547 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
66. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1993). The other coun-
ties joining in the action were Beaver, Clarion, Forest, Tioga and Washington. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 493.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. County of Allegheny, 626 A.2d at 493 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
1994
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leaves the 1987 order "perpetually unenforceable. '72
With the county funding scheme remaining in place, the con-
flicts between common pleas courts and county government offi-
cials continued. In 1992, the court's holding in Lavelle v. Koch 73
further refined the requirements of a court seeking to meet its bur-
den of proving the reasonable necessity of the funding it seeks for
staff salary increases.74 The supreme court said that burden would
be met by a showing that the pay raises were reasonably necessary
to attract and retain qualified people. 5 The court further indicated
that, to establish this burden, evidence of salary levels paid by
competing employers would be needed. 6
For nearly a century, beginning in 1843 with Hepburn and
through In re Surcharge in 1928, the case law had clearly estab-
lished that courts in Pennsylvania have an inherent power to com-
pel the legislature to pay for necessary expenses incurred by the
courts. However, in the last half century, starting in 1949 with
Leahey, the supreme court, while continually reaffirming the exis-
tence of this inherent power, has limited the ways in which it may
be exercised.
First, in Leahey, the supreme court ruled that judges must com-
ply with reasonable statutes governing employee salaries.7 7 Next,
in Carroll, it held that the court bears the burden of proving that
its monetary requests are reasonably necessary. 8 The Beckert
court then defined a reasonably necessary expenditure as one
which the court needs in order to administer justice.79 When the
expenditures involve employee pay, Lavelle established that, to
meet its burden, a court must show the money is needed to attract
and retain qualified people.80 The court's recent ruling in Snyder
adds a further refinement by requiring that this burden be proved
by comparing court employee wages with salaries paid by compet-
72. Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
73. 617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992).
74. Lavelle, 617 A.2d at 322. In Lavelle, the president judge of the Common Pleas
Court of Carbon County sought an additional $22,716 for staff salary increases for the 1988
fiscal year. Id. at 321.
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. The court said a salary scale developed by the plaintiff, based on consultation
of various labor market studies, was not sufficient evidence of what competing employers
were paying, and the court consequently dismissed his complaint in mandamus. Id. at 322-
23.
77. See notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
78. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
79. See notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
80. See notes 18, 74-76 and accompanying text.
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ing employers.8 1 The Snyder holding means that, in order to pre-
vail in future mandamus actions of this type, courts will have to
develop a much stronger pattern of evidence than Plaintiff in Sny-
der provided.
Plaintiff in Snyder did not act outside the structure of the
county salary board, as had the court in Leahey.8 2 In fact, the Jef-
ferson County Commissioners, who made up three of the five mem-
bers of the Salary Board, approved the very salary schedule the
Plaintiff was attempting to follow as he sought the pay raises for
court employees. 8 3 Plaintiff also presented evidence to support his
contention that the increases were necessary to attract and retain
qualified people, as required by the supreme court's holding in La-
velle." Unlike the plaintiff in Lavelle, who informally consulted
some labor market studies to determine appropriate salary levels, 85
Plaintiff in Snyder had a formal, independent survey, commis-
sioned and adopted by the defendant county commissioners.8 6
However, the supreme court disagreed with the study's methodol-
ogy, stating that it did not include a sufficient number of compet-
ing employers within Jefferson County. 7 It is difficult to imagine
which employers within the county, other than the county govern-
ment, might be interested in hiring court administrators and pro-
bation officers. Nevertheless, the study cited by Plaintiff included
comparisons with other counties; however, the supreme court held
that those counties not directly adjacent to Jefferson County could
not be considered to be in the same labor market. 88
The end result was a decision which established a burden of
proof that a common pleas court (especially one in a small, rural
county) may find difficult to meet. It certainly takes a considerable
amount of time to develop a comprehensive study comparing court
wages with salaries paid to other employees in the public and pri-
vate sector. That amount of time may not be available as a normal
county government attempts to meet its yearly budget deadlines.
Moreover, the cost of conducting such a study may be prohibitive
to local governments. Even if it were to have both the time and the
81. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1137-38.
82. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 578.
83. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1135.
84. Lavelle, 617 A.2d at 322.
85. Id. at 322-23.
86. Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1135-36.
87. Id. at 1137-38.
88. Id. at 1137 nn.5-6.
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money for such a study, a common pleas court in a small, rural
area, such as Jefferson County, may find it difficult to locate,
within its labor market, suitable employers in sufficient numbers
for comparison, as the Snyder decision seems to require.
One possible resolution to the problem might be the one the su-
preme court ordered in County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,89
where the court held that the state's unified judicial system re-
quired funding of all common pleas courts by the Commonwealth,
not the individual counties. So far, the state legislature has not
come up with the money to implement that order, and the su-
preme court appears unwilling to enforce it. If a state-wide funding
system were ever implemented, it is quite possible that it would
only change the location of the political battles over court funding
from the county courthouse to the state capitol building. Because
any change seems unlikely, common pleas court judges in Pennsyl-
vania may have to sharpen their political negotiating skills at
budget time, because winning their budget battles in court seems
to get more difficult with each case.
Stephen P. Drexler
89. See notes 62-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of County of Allegheny.
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